

VZCZCXYZ0017

OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8969 2601656

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 161648Z SEP 08

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 098969

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2033

TAGS: [ECON](#) [EFIN](#) [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [PTER](#) [IR](#) [UK](#) [CH](#) [SK](#) [HK](#) [PINR](#)

SUBJECT: SOLICITING SUPPORT TO PUSH CHINA ON  
PROLIFERATION-RELATED TRADE WITH IRAN

Classified By: EAP A/S CHRISTOPHER R. HILL for  
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4.

-----  
SUMMARY/BACKGROUND  
-----

12. (S) Singapore is one of the busiest transshipment points for trade between China and Iran. As such, and as a friend and partner of the United States, it is a key player in combating proliferation and enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) directed at thwarting Iran's development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Singapore could also bring to bear limited, but potentially effective pressure on China to aggressively implement UNSCRs as well as more effectively enforce China's own export controls regarding transfers of dual-use and military items to Iran. We are therefore seeking Singapore's cooperation in convincing Beijing to stop Chinese entities from selling commodities used in Iran's weapons programs.

13. (S) Ships carrying cargo of proliferation concern from China to Iran regularly call in Singapore for services or transshipping of cargo. The United States has on occasion requested Singapore to detain and inspect cargo based upon information indicating an Iranian end-user designated under applicable UN Security Council Resolution. Singapore has been willing to take appropriate action on occasions in the past, but then faces the problem of the disposition of seized items. We want to inform Singapore of our efforts to constructively address China's proliferation to Iran and suggest Singapore raise its own concerns with China.

-----  
OBJECTIVE/ACTION REQUEST  
-----

14. (S) Post is instructed to present the non-paper at para 5 to appropriate host government officials, with the aim of pursuing the following objectives:

-- Outline our concerns with appropriate host government officials;

-- Inform Singapore of our efforts to constructively address China's proliferation to Iran by pushing for action at the source of the shipments in China; and

-- Suggest that host government approach China for corrective measures to prevent illicit shipments from reaching Singapore.

-----  
NONPAPER FOR SINGAPORE  
-----

15. (SECRET//REL SINGAPORE) BEGIN POINTS:

-- We are sharing information with a number of key partners to develop a concerted diplomatic approach to China to persuade China to enforce its export control laws more effectively. We also seek to press Beijing to aggressively implement relevant UNSCRs to prevent transfers and transshipment of items that could be used to bolster Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs or of conventional arms to Iran.

-- Your port is one of the busiest transshipment points for trade between China and Iran and we are seeking your advice and assistance in working with China to stem transfers of WMD-related items and technology.

-- Over the past several years, the United States has made repeated approaches to Beijing at all levels regarding transfers by Chinese entities of weapons-related items to Iran, as well as transshipments of concern via Chinese sea ports.

-- While China's nonproliferation record has improved in some areas, certain state-owned Chinese entities and private firms continue to export or transship key items and/or dual-use technology needed to develop weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.

-- Chinese companies continue to deal with companies that are fronts for entities designated under UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803.

-- Our information suggests that Chinese companies continue to transfer items to Iran, regardless of end-user, that are prohibited pursuant to UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 due to their possible use in Iran's nuclear or delivery vehicle programs.

-- We would be interested in beginning a dialogue with you about these proliferation concerns and hearing your ideas on how to approach this issue with the Chinese.

-- We have attempted to drive home to Chinese officials that if China comes to be perceived within the United States as a supporter or defender of Iran, a country widely viewed as a sponsor of terrorism and one that refuses to address international concerns over its nuclear programs, this could ultimately damage China's reputation and its bilateral relationship with the United States.

-- Our engagement with China highlights the importance of Beijing setting a good example as a responsible international stakeholder and actor on nonproliferation issues in general.

-- We look forward to working with you on this and other related security and counter-proliferation matters, and are prepared to provide additional information as appropriate.

END POINTS FOR SINGAPORE.

-----  
REPORTING DEADLINE  
-----

¶6. (U) Posts should report results within two weeks of delivery. Please slug replies for ISN, INR, T, Treasury, NEA, and EAP. Please include SIPDIS in all replies.

-----  
POINT OF CONTACT  
-----

¶7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up information are M.G. Coppola, EAP/MTS, (202) 647-2769, coppolamg@state.sgov.gov, and Michelle New, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-0186, newml@state.sgov.gov.

¶8. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance.  
RICE